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INTRODUCTION 
This brief is submitted in reply to plaintiffs/appellee 
Wardley Corporation's arguments in opposition to Welsh's appeal 
from the lower court's entry of judgment herein, and in opposition 
to Wardley's cross-appeal on the lower court's denial of attorney's 
fees • 
JURISDICTION 
Welsh agrees with Wardley's statement of jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Welsh disagrees with the statement of issues on cross-appeal 
as presented by Wardley, and offers the following statement of 
issues and standard of review: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the 
written contract between Welsh and Leon Peterson, taken as a whole 
and viewed within its four corners, unambiguously manifested an 
intent on the part of the contracting parties to confer upon 
Wardley the right to recover attorney's fees in the event of 
nonpayment of the commission provided for therein. 
Standard of Review: Correctness; however, a finding of 
ambiguity should be sustained if the language of the contract is 
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies. Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.~2d 1350 
(Utah 1996). 
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2. Whether the lower court properly determined that 
Wardley failed to sustain its burden of proof in establishing, by 
extrinsic, that the contracting parties (Welsh and Leon Peterson) 
intended to confer upon Wardley the right to recover attorney's 
fees under the written contract. 
Standard of Review: Clearly erroneous. Edwards & Daniels 
Architects, Inc. v. Farmers Properties, Inc., 865 P.2d 1382 (Utah 
App. 1993); Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, REGULATIONS, 
AND CASE LAW ON CROSS APPEAL 
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P. 2d 1314 (Utah 1982) : 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P. 2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Welsh adopts their reference to statement of the case set 
out in appellant's brief herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Welsh offers the following statement of facts in connection 
with the issues on cross-appeal herein: 
In its Complaint, Wardley asserted the right to attorney's 
fees as a named third-party beneficiary under the May 31, 1994 
contract. Complaint (R. 1-17) at % 21. Wardley sought summary 
judgment on attorneys' fees; The Court rejected this argument and 
reserved the right to recover attorney's fees for trial. Order of 
Partial Summary Judgment of November 15, 1996 (R. 336-338). 
The May 31, 1994 contract (Defendant's Exhibit 2, R. 350-
352) was entered into between defendant Welsh and Leon Peterson. 
It was negotiated, finalized and executed by defendant Welsh and 
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Leon Peterson without participation or input of any kind from 
Wardley, Trial Testimony of Randy Young (R, 609-611) . Paragraph 
17 of the May 31, 1994 agreement states in pertinent part as 
follows: 
In any action arising out of this contract, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and 
reasonable attorneys fees. 
Defendant's Exhibit 2 (R. 350-352) at p. 2 (emphasis added), 
Wardley is not a named party to the agreement. Defendant's 
Exhibit 2 (R. 350-352), 
There was no discussion between defendant Welsh and Leon 
Peterson, the parties negotiating the terms of the contract, 
concerning Wardley's right to attorney's fees in the event it 
claimed rights under the agreement. Testimony of Grant Welsh (R. 
717-719), Defendant Welsh did not intend, in executing the 
contract, to confer upon Wardley a right to recover attorney's fees 
thereunder; Leon Peterson likewise manifested no intent to confer 
upon Wardley the right to recover attorney's fees under the 
contract. Testimony of Grant Welsh (R. 717-719). 
At trial, Wardley presented no evidence whatsoever 
establishing any right to recover attorney's fees, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. The trial court correctly found that the written 
agreement of May 31, 1994 between Welsh and Leon Peterson did not 
unambiguously establish an intent by the contracting parties to 
confer upon Wardley the right to recover attorney's fees incident 
to enforcement of any third-party beneficiary rights which Wardley 
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may have had under the contract. The contracting parties were 
Welsh and Leon Peterson; Wardley was at best a non-party 
beneficiary under law, whose rights under the agreement were 
function of the intent of the contracting parties. As such, 
language in a printed form, conferring the right to recovery 
attorney's fees on "the prevailing party" (when the form was not 
intended to create any rights in a non-party beneficiary) was 
clearly ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence was warranted. 
2. Wardley failed outright to establish, by extrinsic 
evidence, an intent on behalf of the contracting parties to bestow 
upon it the right to recover attorney's fees. As the party 
asserting a right to fees, Wardley bore the burden of proof in this 
regard. Not only has Wardley failed to marshall evidence in 
support of the lower court's finding on the attorney's fees, but 
failed outright at trial to present any evidence whatsoever that 
the contracting parties intended to bestow upon it the right to 
recover attorney's fees in connection with the recovery of the 
commission. All evidence presented, in fact, was to the contrary. 
3. Wardley has no statutory right to recover attorneys 
fees. Legislative history of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 manifests 
no intent to confer rights to the recovery of attorneys fees on 
non-party beneficiaries. 
ARGUMENT 
Wardley's brief, like the trial court's ruling, relies on 
one fact alone: that Welsh signed writings purporting to disclaim 
the absence of an agency relationship with Wardley. By writings 
235769.1 4 
after the fact, in other words, Welsh unilaterally absolved Wardley 
of all obligations of a real estate licensee under law. 
Yet the whole purpose of Wardley's actions was to recover a 
realtor's commission. Either that commission was earned as Welsh's 
real estate agent, or it was not earned at all - there are no 
"coordinating agents" under Utah's regulatory system, 
Wardley was constituted Welsh's agent by acting as his agent 
according to statutory definitions. By failing to comply with 
requirements incumbent on it under the same statutory scheme, 
though, Wardley forfeits its right to commission. 
POINT I 
WELSH IS NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHALL EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS 
Wardley begins by making the preliminary argument that Welsh 
failed to "marshall evidence" challenging the lower court's 
findings of fact, which must therefore stand undisturbed, 
Wardley's argument in this regard misconstrues the nature of 
Welsh's appeal from the lower court's ruling. 
The requiring of "marshalling of evidence" is not well-
defined in the law. Where addressed, though, it relates only to 
challenges to the evidentiary sufficiency of a finding of fact made 
at trial. It contemplates that the appellant "marshall" all 
evidence adduced at trial in support of the finding, and then 
establish why it was insufficient. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 
(Utah 1991) . The doctrine of marshalling of evidence, however, has 
no application whatever where an appeal is taken from the grant of 
summary judgment, where the appellate court scrutinizes the lower 
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court's ruling for correctness, giving no deference to the lower 
court's ruling and in fact construing all available facts against 
the ruling. See Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 
647 (Utah App. 1993). Similarly, where the challenge is not to a 
findings of fact but to a conclusion of law, the standard is 
correctness of the lower court's ruling, and does not contemplate 
the marshalling of evidence. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 
P.2d , 197 Utah App. LEXIS 107 (Utah App. 1997). 
Welsh set out his statement of issues presented for review 
and standard of review at pages 2-7 of his opening brief. 
Wardley's brief took no exception either to the issues as 
presented, nor the applicable standard of review presented with 
respect thereto; accordingly, both must be established as 
controlling for purposes of this appeal - see Rule 24(b)(1), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. As noted therein, all issues in this 
case with the sole exception of whether Wardley held a "net 
listing" with Welsh were resolved by the lower court's grant of 
summary judgment thereon (R. 336-338). By virtue of that order, 
the court foreclosed all question whether any agency relationship 
of whatever nature existed between Wardley and Welsh, or whether a 
resulting fiduciary obligation of any kind existed (R. 180-183, 
230-233, 764-769). At the onset of trial, the court denied Welsh's 
request that the pleadings be amended in order to permit a more 
reasoned consideration of whether an agency or listing existed, 
reiterating that the sole issue remaining to be tried was whether 
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a "net listing" had been created between Wardley and Welsh (R. 574-
579) . 
Wardley thereupon proceeded to present evidence concerning 
the nature of the agreement between Wardley and Welsh, and whether 
it did or did not constitute a "net listing". Again, the court 
admonished counsel not to reopen the question of agency (R. 594-
595, 685) . 
The lower court, however, never reached the factual 
questions surrounding the "net listing" question. Instead, the 
court reverted to the foreclosed agency question based on testimony 
of Welsh's expert, Arnold Stringham, who properly pointed out that 
a net listing contemplates an agency relationship between the owner 
and the broker/agent (R. 686-687, 703-704). In handwritten notes 
made during the course of trial (R. 353-355), and again during the 
bench ruling (761-773), the lower court articulated its rationale 
that (1) no "net listing" could exist if there were no listing 
agreement; (2) a "listing agreement" implied and required an agency 
relationship; and (3) the court had resolved the agency question on 
summary j udgment. 
Under these circumstances, and particularly given Wardley's 
consent to the standard of review set out in Welsh's opening brief, 
this court needs to review the lower court's entire ruling for 
correctness, and reverse its finding denying the existence of an 
agency relationship. 
To the extent that marshalling is warranted on the single 
issue even presented at trial, it is simply accomplished. There is 
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no question that an express, written listing agreement - "net" or 
otherwise - was never created between Wardley and Welsh; further, 
that Welsh disclaimed the existence of an agency relationship with 
Wardley in writing. These facts were established by direct 
testimony of Randy Young (R. 588, 596-597); by Welsh's trial 
testimony (R. 639, 644, 658, 665-667), defendant's Exhibit 2 (R. 
350-352), and plaintiff's Exhibit 2 (R.f 349). In fact, Welsh did 
not believe Wardley to have been his agent in this transaction, in 
reliance on Randall Young's representations that he had an agency 
relationship with Leon Peterson as the buyer (R. 192-195, 666-667). 
Yet the undeniable facts remain: Wardley, in the capacity 
of a licensee under the state of Utah, set out to arrange a sale of 
property between Welsh and Leon Peterson, with the expectation of 
receiving a commission on the transaction. To go no further than 
did the trial court, and conclude that, because no express listing 
agreement was entered into between Welsh and Wardley prior to the 
transaction, Wardley may constitute itself a "coordinating agent", 
with no fiduciary obligation to any party to the transaction, would 
be to foster a proposition foreclosed by Utah law (see Welsh's 
opening brief at pp. 21-31) . What words the parties used to 
characterize their relationship is irrelevant to the nature of that 
relationship according to the governing statute. 
The lower court found, as a conclusion of law -- not a 
finding of fact -- that no listing agreement of whatever nature 
existed between Welsh and Wardley (R. 465) . The predicate 
assumptions underlying that conclusion were likewise determined by 
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the lower court as a matter of law. This court must overturn those 
determinations if any state of fact exists which render the lower 
court's ruling is incorrect, and neither the "clearly erroneous" 
standard, nor the marshalling of evidence doctrine, have any 
application, 
POINT II 
WELSH ADDRESSED ALL ARGUMENTS RAISED ON APPEAL IN 
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, 
Wardley next claims that Welsh is raising its breach of 
statutory obligations incident to its status as a real estate 
broker and agent for the first time on appeal, having never 
addressed these matters to the lower court. Wardley's argument 
here is something of a mystery; it is easily answered by a review 
of the record before the trial court. 
In his initial response to Wardley's motion for summary 
judgment herein, Welsh expressly argued that summary judgment was 
improper in that Randy Young, on behalf of Wardley, had 
misrepresented the nature of Wardley's agency relationships with 
the parties to the transaction, asserting that the totality of 
circumstances made out Wardley to be the agent of Welsh, Leon 
Peterson, or both, holding a fiduciary responsibility accordingly 
(R.122-125), In his Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Wardley's Motion For Summary Judgment, Welsh again addressed the 
question of fiduciary responsibility, pointing out that Randy Young 
had characterized Wardley as a "dual agent", and that he held a 
"net listing" with Welsh (R,196-200); further, that the failure to 
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obtain written consent to the agency arrangement should deprive 
Wardley of its right to a commission (R.201-203). 
Welsh thereafter attempted to amend his answer to assert, in 
more complete detail, the nature and extent of Wardley's breaches 
of its agency obligations to Welsh (R.394-398); this motion was 
denied by the court's order of January 2, 1997 (R.426-427). 
In short, Welsh attempted repeatedly to address to the trial 
court the existence and scope of Wardley's agency obligations, his 
breach thereof, and the resulting application of statutory 
penalties. The fact that the lower court refused to permit Welsh 
to take these issues to trial does not mean that they were not 
preserved for appeal - the court's orders on all pending motions, 
objections, etc. become final and appealable upon the entry of 
final judgment. See Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Wardley argues that, incident to this appeal, Welsh has 
identified more statutory and regulatory violations arising out of 
Wardley's conduct than were specifically addressed to the trial 
court. The contention is an error to begin with - all statutory 
and regulatory provisions relied upon by Welsh in this appeal were 
cited through the lower court, either incident to Wardley's own 
summary judgment motion, or as part of Welsh's motion to amend his 
answer (which Wardley expressly opposed on the ground that, since 
the court had already determined, as a matter of law, that no 
agency relationship - and therefore no fiduciary obligation -
existed between Wardley and Welsh, all such matters were irrelevant 
(R.401-403)) . In his bench ruling, and later written order, 
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denying Welsh's motion to amend, the court made clear that all such 
issues had been foreclosed on summary judgment, and that further 
proceedings would be limited to the question of whether there 
existed a "net listing" between the parties. Given the lower 
court's erroneous ruling on the law concerning the agency 
relationship between the parties, Welsh is entitled to address to 
this court the full nature and scope of Wardley's breach of its 
fiduciary obligations, 
POINT III 
WARDLEY ACTED AS AGENT FOR WELSH, LEON PETERSON, OR 
BOTH, UNDER UTAH STATUTORY LAW 
At 3. of its opposing brief, Wardley attempts to sidestep 
the clear import of Utah's statutory and regulatory scheme 
concerning licensed real estate brokers and agents by claiming that 
it was entitled to function as a "coordinating agent" (i.e., having 
no fiduciary obligation to buyer or seller), based on nothing but 
a post-transaction writing, to which Wardley was not even a party, 
purporting to disclaim any agency relationship as an accommodation 
to the buyer. In other words, in the wake of the very confusion 
created by its own failure to abide by Utah laws and regulations 
governing the disclosure of, and consent to, real estate agency 
relationships, Wardley attempts to seize upon a writing created 
after the fact, as a vehicle for excusing its own non-compliance 
with governing law, while still collecting its commission._ 
Wardley claims that Welsh's fundamental position - that a 
licensed broker or agent in Utah may not be a "coordinating agent" 
having no fiduciary obligations to the parties - "is inaccurate and 
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is not supported by case law, statute, rule or regulation" 
(Opposing Brief at p. 14) . Yet not one statute or case is cited in 
support of its position. Wardley's only citation is an 
inexplicable reference to R.162-6-1.6.1.9, which forbids a licensed 
agent to pay a finder's fee or other consideration to an unlicensed 
person or entity for referring a prospect. How this prohibition 
permits a licensee to avoid all fiduciary obligations to either 
principal in a real estate transaction by simply declaring itself 
a "coordinating broker" is not explained. Wardley's complete 
failure to address its noncompliance with Utah's regulatory scheme 
governing real estate licensees only punctuates the fact of its 
violations, and mandates the reversal of the lower court's ruling 
on summary j udgment. 
At pp. 15-16 of its brief, Wardley apparently argues that 
Welsh somehow satisfied Wardley's pre-contract disclosure 
requirements imposed by law through a post-transaction writing. In 
support of the argument, Wardley cites to Rule R.162-6-2.7, which 
requires full disclosure "prior to the buyer and 
seller. . .entering into a binding agreement with each other". The 
evidence before the lower court on Wardley's motion for summary 
judgment was undisputed that Welsh went to the final execution of 
the real estate contract with Leon Peterson understanding that 
Wardley was acting as Peterson's agent; only upon formulating the 
final written contract did the parties discover that, in fact, each 
of them believed that Wardley was representing the other. Wardley 
should not be permitted to shelter behind the parties' subsequent 
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efforts to resolve the problem created by its violation of law as 
a means to circumvent the application of that law, 
POINT IV 
WELSH DID NOT REFUSE TO ALLOW WARDLEY TO ACT AS HIS 
AGENT. 
At pp. 17-18 of its brief, Wardley claims that it is exempt 
from responsibility to comply with law applicable to real estate 
agents by reason of Welsh's "refusal" to allow Wardley to "act as 
his agent"- Wardley's argument ignores the fact that, at the time 
it granted summary judgment herein, the lower court was faced with 
declarations of Welsh, Randy Young, and others establishing that, 
whatever the labels placed on the relationship may have been, 
Wardley was, in fact, acting as Welsh's agent, actively seeking 
buyers for property owned by Welsh, with the understanding that he 
would receive a commission in the amount of whatever sales price he 
(Young) set, less $18,500.00 per acre to Welsh. To characterize 
this as other than an agency relationship is to ignore completely 
the clear, plain and unambiguous language of the statutory and 
regulatory framework discussed at pp. 21-32 of Welsh's opening 
brief. 
It is certainly true, as set out in his own affidavit, that 
Welsh believed that Wardley was Leon Peterson's agent throughout 
the transaction. Wardley's agency status, however, is established 
herein under the totality of circumstances, and not by the 
mutually-inconsistent understandings of the principals in the 
transaction (which understanding was generated by Wardley's failure 
to act in accordance with state law). 
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POINT V 
DUTIES APPLICABLE TO REAL ESTATE AGENTS GENERALLY 
ARE INCUMBENT UPON WARDLEY, 
At Point V of its opposing brief, Wardley attempts to avoid 
the application of Utah law to its conduct by arguing that the 
cited provisions of the Utah Code and the Utah Administrative Code 
relate strictly to relations between agents and principals. Since 
Wardley was functioning as a "coordinating agent", it argues, these 
provisions have no application. 
This argument was adequately addressed in Welsh's opening 
brief. Here, it only need be observed that Wardley's position 
simply begs the question whether (1) it was acting as an agent in 
this transaction or not, or (2) whether, agency relationship or no, 
it is required as a licensee under the laws of the state of Utah to 
abide by the provisions applicable to such licensees generally. 
The answer to both these questions is clearly in the affirmative --
see opening brief at pages 21-32, 
POINT VI 
WARDLEY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH WELSH CONSTITUTED AN 
UNLAWFUL AND PROHIBITED "NET LISTING". 
At pages 21-23 of its opposing brief, Wardley argues that no 
"net listing" existed between the parties, since the real estate 
agency contract specified a sum certain as commission to Wardley, 
Wardley attempted to argue this position at trial, and the 
fallacy thereof were quickly pointed out by witness Arnold 
Stringham -- the contract between Welsh and Leon Peterson was not 
a listing agreement at all, but a contract of purchase and sale (R. 
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692-693). In any transaction involving a net listing, where the 
agent has produced a buyer willing to purchase, the final contract 
will set out a sum certain as purchase price (and therefore a sum 
certain commission). The fact that the final agreement sets the 
amount which will be paid to the listing agent does not vitiate the 
nature of the prior listing agreement as a "net listing", provided 
the other elements thereof are met. 
For the same reason, Wardley may not rely upon the terms of 
the purchase and sale agreement between Welsh and Leon Peterson as 
precluding consideration of the true nature of the agency 
relationships between Welsh and Wardley under the parol evidence 
rule. As pointed out elsewhere, Wardley was not even a party to 
the agreement between Welsh and Leon Peterson; as such, that 
agreement was clearly not intended as an integration of any agency, 
listing or net listing arrangement between Wardley and Welsh, and 
the parol evidence rule does not preclude establishing the 
existence of such an arrangement -- see Union Bank v\ Swenson, 707 
P. 2d 663 (Utah 1985); Lee v. Kimura, 634 P. 2d 1043 (Haw. App. 
1981) . 
With respect to Wardley's reliance on the non-existence of 
a listing agreement of any kind between the parties, see Points 
III-V, above. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED WELSH'S MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEND HIS ANSWER. 
Contrary to Wardley"s assertion, at page 23-26 of the 
proposing brief, Welsh's motion to amend his answer prior to trial 
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was not an attempt to transform or expand the issues pending before 
the court. It was, rather, an attempt to frame the pleadings to 
reflect the issues that had been developed in discovery and motion 
practice prior to that time. It is acknowledged that many of the 
issues raised by the proposed amended answer had already been 
addressed and ruled upon by the court incident to Wardley's summary 
judgment motion. Nevertheless, Welsh was entitled to an order of 
the court amending the pleadings to reflect properly the full scope 
of the parties' dispute herein. Such amendment is clearly 
contemplated by Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
would have served to clarify and define the issues both for the 
remaining disposition before the trial court, and incident to this 
appeal. The whole thrust of the law surrounding the amendment of 
pleadings, both prior to and even during or following trial, is to 
afford the parties to plead and argue whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P. 
2d 1178 (Utah 1993). Indeed, the proposed amendment would have 
clarified the issues both for the trial court and for this appeal, 
avoiding the very dispute raised at Point 2 of Wardley's brief. 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED WARDLEY AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Wardley's sole issue on cross appeal is that the lower court 
should have awarded it attorneys fees. Reliance in this regard is 
placed exclusively on the May 31, 1994 real estate purchase 
contract between Welsh and Leon Peterson. 
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Attorney's fees are not recoverable as a matter of course in 
litigation. Rather, a prevailing party litigant may recover 
attorney's fees only where such recovery is contracted for by the 
parties to an agreement, or where permitted by statute or mandated 
by equity. See Ranch Homes, Inc. v. The Greater Park Corporation, 
592 P.2d 620 (Utah 1979); B&R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 
442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Blake v. Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 
454 (1966) . The burden of proof in establishing contractual right 
of attorney's fees rests with the claimant: 
[A] party requesting an award of attorney's fees has 
the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to 
support the award. 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P. 2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996). 
The rights of a beneficiary to a contract to which it is not 
a party, like all other rights and obligations arising under 
private agreement, are a function of the intent of the contracting 
parties. As stated in Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 
P.2d 1314 (Utah 1982): 
Generally, the rights of a third-party beneficiary 
are determined by the intentions of the parties to 
the subject contract. [Citation omitted] Where it 
appears from the promise or the contracting 
situation that the parties intended that a third 
party receive a benefit, then the third party may 
enforce his rights in the courts and is deemed a 
donee beneficiary. . . . But where any benefits to 
a person are incidental to the performance of the 
promise and such person is neither a donee nor a 
creditor beneficiary, he is a stranger for the 
promise and they assert no rights thereunder. 
652 P.2d at p. 1315 (emphasis added) . The intent of the parties to 
a written contract is to be determined, if possible, first by 
examination of the four corners of the contract itself; if the 
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language of the writing is ambiguous, the intent of the contracting 
parties may be shown by extrinsic evidence. Willard Pease Oil & 
Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766 (Utah 1995); Estate 
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992); C&Y Corp. v. 
General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995). 
Before trial, Wardley argued its right, as a non-party 
beneficiary under the contract, to attorney's fees as a matter of 
law; the court rejected this argument and set the matter for trial. 
At trial, Wardley presented no evidence whatever of its right to 
attorney's fees under the contract. At the conclusion of evidence, 
though, Wardley again attempted to argue that the May 31, 1994 
agreement plainly and unambiguously manifests, on its face, an 
intent of the contracting parties to bestow a right of attorney's 
fees on Wardley. 
The trial court rejected Wardley's argument in this regard, 
holding that the language of the agreement did not unambiguously 
manifest an intent that Wardley be permitted to recover attorneys 
fees incident to enforcing any rights which it may have under the 
contract, observing that Wardley had presented no evidence whatever 
on the issue at trial. 
On appeal, Wardley argues that (1) the contract should have 
been strictly construed against Welsh as its drafter, (2) the 
wording of the contract unambiguously conferred upon Wardley the 
right to recover attorneys fees, and (3) other jurisdictions that 
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have awarded attorneys fees to third-party beneficiaries. None of 
these positions has merit, 
A. The Lower Court is Not Obliged to Construe the Contract 
Against the Drafter, 
Wardley first argues that, given the uncertainty of the 
contract language regarding the rights of a non-party beneficiary 
to recover attorneys fees, the contract should have been construed 
against Welsh as the drafter of the language in question, reliance 
is placed on Trolley Square Assoc. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61 (Utah 
1994), and Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 
1988). Wardley7s theory in this regard fails on two fundamental 
points, 
First, the ambiguous language concerning the right of a 
party to recover attorneys fees was not drafted by Welsh at all. 
It was part of the printed form used by both Welsh and Leon 
Peterson in framing the transaction. 
A far more fundamental flaw, however, is the fact that the 
rule of contract interpretation in Wardley7s cited cases assumes 
that no extrinsic evidence has been adduced to determined the 
contracting parties7 intent. In this regard, Wardley flatly 
states--without any support whatever--that there was no extrinsic 
evidence presented to a lower court on this issue. In this regard, 
Wardley has not only failed to marshall evidence actually presented 
to the lower court in compliance with the argument addressed at 
Point I of its brief, but has flatly mischaracterized the evidence 
presented: 
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Q: Grant, when you signed Defendant's Exhibit 2, the 
contract (unintelligible) with Leon Peterson, before 
you signed that, the very next meeting that you had 
with him, did you and he have any conversation about 
whether or not either one of you had intended that 
Wardley get attorneys fees if they had to sue for their 
commission? 
A: No discussion whatsoever. 
Q: . • . [D] id you have any conversation with Mr, Peterson 
at any time other than the time you signed the 
agreement concerning whether or not Wardley would have 
an entitlement to attorneys fees if they didn't get 
that commission? 
A: No, 
Q: Was it ever your intent in signing that agreement that 
if Wardley didn't get their attorneys fees they would 
be able to collect--or didn't get their commission, 
they would be able to collect--
A: No." 
(R. 1717-719.) 
According to the undisputed evidence at trial, therefore, 
the contracting parties--Welsh and Leon Peterson--had no 
discussions establishing an intent to confer upon Wardley the right 
to recover attorneys fees incident to commission collections under 
the contract, and Welsh had no intention that such be the case. 
Only if the evidence is completely lacking, or in conflict, is the 
court to construe ambiguous terms against the drafter Allstate 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford, 772 P. 2d 466 (Utah 1989). Here, 
the uncontested evidence established no intent to confer 
contractual rights of attorneys fees recovery upon Wardley. As 
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such, the lower court properly ruled that no such rights were 
intended and did not exist, 
B. Language of the Contract is at Best Ambiguous with 
Respect to Wardley's Rights to Attorneys Fees, 
Wardley next argues that the contract, plainly and 
ambiguously on its face, confers rights upon Wardley, as a non-
party beneficiary, to recover attorneys fees. 
It is undisputed, in this regard, that plaintiff is not a 
"party" to the contract according to the customary usage of that 
term. Contracting parties, by definition, are those persons or 
entities agreeing with each other - see Restatement 2d, Contracts, 
§ 9. Plaintiff was not an agreeing party to the contract of 
May 31, 1994—it had no role whatever in negotiating or finalizing 
any of the terms thereof, and learned of the contract only after 
the fact. Any rights which plaintiff may have under the contract, 
as admitted in its own pleadings, arise as a non-party beneficiary. 
Third-party beneficiaries are "persons who are 
recognized as having enforceable rights created in 
them by a contract to which they are not parties and 
for which they give no consideration' [citation 
omitted] . For a third-party beneficiary to have a 
right to enforce a right, the intention of the 
contracting parties to confer a separate and 
distinct benefit upon the third party must be clear. 
[Citation omitted]. 
Rio Algom Corp. v. GIMCO, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980) . The 
printed form's reference to "parties", therefore, establishes if 
anything that Wardley had no rights thereunder. 
C. Wardley Has No Cause of Action for Attorneys Fees Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5. 
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Wardley next claims that under Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-56.5, 
even though it was not a party to the contract under which it is 
pursuing, and even though it was undisputed that the contracting 
parties evidenced no intent (within the four corners of the written 
contract or by extrinsic evidence) to confer a right to recover 
attorney's fees upon it, plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees 
as a matter of law because the contracting parties conferred the 
right of recovery of attorney's fees upon each other. 
To begin with, Wardley's claim in this respect is untimely 
raised. The complaint in this action makes no mention of any 
statutory right to recover attorney's fees, including the provision 
on which it now seeks to rely. The complaint refers exclusively to 
the language of the contract which, as shown above, fails to confer 
upon it any right to recover attorney's fees. It is well-
established that any statutory claim for an award of attorney's 
fees which is not raised in the pleadings is deemed waived. See 
Ledger Construction, Inc. v. Robert, Inc., 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 
1976); Christensen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 669 P.2d 1236 
(Utah 1983); Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798 P.2d 
738 (Utah 1990). 
Even disregarding plaintiff's failure to preserve its 
statutory claim for attorney's fees in the pleadings, however, the 
claim fails on its face. Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-56.5 was intended 
for one purpose only: to make the right to recover attorney's fees 
reciprocal in any agreement where it has been reserved to one, but 
not the other, party to the contract. No Utah case law has ever 
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extended rights under the statute to non-parties suing under an 
agreement. Debates in both houses of the Utah Legislature 
concerning House Bill 175 of 1986 (enacted as Utah Code Ann, § 78-
26-56,5), moreover, make clear that the policy behind the provision 
was limited to rights as between contracting parties: 
If these salesmen come to the door of our elderly 
citizens and have them sign a contract for services, 
if their written contract provides that if they do 
not conform with the terms of the agreement, that 
they may take them to court and require - and 
collect attorney's fees. However, if the party 
feels they have been defrauded or have some other 
defense, if they go to fight it, they win, they may 
have won, but they still have to pay for their own 
attorneys' fees, but if they'd lost, they would have 
to pay the other guy's attorneys' fees. All this 
says, you notice the bill, is that a court may award 
costs and attorneys' fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory 
note, contract or other writing executed after April 
28th...If one party can recover also it's 
reciprocal. And this would just make it fair. 
House Debate on House Bill No. 175, January 27, 1986. 
Currently under the law, you can only have 
attorneys' fees awarded to you if it's provided by 
the contract or by statute. For example on lien 
law, if you file a lien it's by statute - you can 
add attorney's fees onto it. Many times contracts 
are written with what we call "boiler plate". In 
other words, they write paragraphs and paragraphs 
and paragraphs in the contract to protect whoever 
may draw up the contract. And what generally these 
boiler plates say is that one party can get 
attorneys' fees but not the other party. What this 
Bill simply says is if the contract is like that, 
then it becomes mutual. That either party, whoever 
may be the prevailing party, can then be awarded 
attorneys' fees. 
Senate Debate on House Bill No. 175, February 20, 1986. 
If an agreement - if somebody presents you with a 
contract and in that contract it says that if you 
decide you have the right to get attorney's fees and 
it doesn't say, there is no reciprocal agreement in 
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the contract. This says that if one of them gets 
it, you both get it. So, if one of them -if the 
document or contract or note permits one party to 
prevail, to get attorney's fees if you prevail, the 
law would now say the winning party, regardless, so 
it goes both ways, regardless of how it says in the 
contract. 
Senate Debate on House Bill 175, February 25, 1986. The purpose of 
the statute's framers, in other words, was to avoid the situation 
where one contracting party is entitled to attorney's fees in the 
event of breach by the other contracting party, but not the 
reverse. It has no application to situations such as that before 
the court, where a non-party beneficiary is seeking an award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to a contract where neither contracting 
party intended such an award as part of their agreement. It is not 
the function of the judiciary to expand the application of a 
statute beyond the intent of its framers, but to give effect to 
that intent in light of the statute's underlying policy and 
legislative history. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P. 2d 83 8 
(Utah 1990). 
Wardley attempts to argue cases from Arizona and Oregon in 
support of its claim for attorneys fees under the Utah Statute. 
Neither case is applicable. 
National Indemnity Company v. The St. Paul Insurance 
Company, 150 Ariz. 492, 724 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1985) dealt 
with Arizona's statute which is completely dissimilar from the Utah 
statute, providing that attorney's fees may be recovered in an 
action "arising out of a contract, express or implied" -- A.R.S. 
§ 12-341.01A. Golden West Insulation, Inc. v. Stardust Investment 
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Corp., 47 Ore. App. 493, 615 P.2d 1048 (Ct. App. Ore. 1980) dealt 
with an erroneous claim by a contracting party against an 
individual whom the plaintiff believed to be a party to the 
contract, but who in fact was not. The opinion held that, under 
these circumstances, the non-party to the contract -- having 
established that he was not a contracting party -- was entitled to 
recover of attorney's fees, since the plaintiff would have 
recovered attorney's fees if the contrary had been proven. The 
case has no application to the facts before the Court in this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
If Wardley was not acting as Welsh's agent, pursuant to a 
listing agreement covering the property at issue, it has no right 
as a licensed agent to recover a commission for the services which 
it claims earned the commission. If Wardley was Welsh's agent, its 
violation of numerous statutory and regulatory provisions preclude 
the recovery of a commission. 
Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the judgment 
entered by the lower court in this action on January 8, 1997 be 
reversed, and the matter remanded to the direction to enter 
judgment in favor of Welsh and against Wardley. 
DATED this <2^J day of October, 1997. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
*Y'— ± -
Vincent'C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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